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Revisiting the Effects of Unemployment 
Insurance Extensions on Unemployment: 
A Measurement‑Error‑Corrected Regression 
Discontinuity Approach†
By Steven Dieterle, Otávio Bartalotti, and Quentin Brummet*
This study documents two potential biases in recent analyses of UI 
 benefit extensions using boundary-based identification: bias from 
using county-level aggregates and bias from  across-border  policy 
spillovers. To examine the first bias, the analysis uses a  regression 
discontinuity approach that accounts for  measurement error 
in  county-level aggregates. These results suggest much smaller 
effects than previous studies, casting doubt on the  applicability of 
 border-based designs. The analysis then shows substantial  spillover 
effects of UI benefit duration on across-border work  patterns, 
 consistent with increased tightness in high-benefit states and 
 providing evidence against a dominant vacancy reduction response 
to UI extensions. (JEL E24, E32, J22, J64, J65)
While the extension of Unemployment Insurance (UI) benefit duration from 26 weeks to as many as 99 weeks represents one of the key policy responses 
to rising unemployment in the United States during the Great Recession, the 
total effect of these UI benefit extensions is theoretically ambiguous. UI benefit 
 extensions may impact labor markets through a host of labor supply and demand 
channels, and the labor demand effects may either reinforce or offset the  supply 
response. Therefore, the net effect of UI extensions is an empirical question. 
Moreover,  while  there is a long history of studies on the labor supply effect of 
reduced search effort in response to such extensions (Solon 1979, Moffitt 1985, 
Katz and Meyer 1990, Meyer 1990, Rothstein 2011a), there is a sparser, more 
recent literature that estimates the total, or macro, effect of extensions inclusive of 
the labor demand response (Lalive, Landais, and Zweimüller 2015; Johnston and 
Mas 2016; Hagedorn et al. 2016; Hagedorn, Manovskii, and Mitman 2016; Boone 
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et al. 2016; Marinescu 2017; Chodorow-Reich, Coglianese, and Karabarbounis 
2019a).
The recent literature estimating the total effect of UI extensions on labor 
 market  conditions across the United States during the Great Recession provides 
mixed results. An influential paper by Hagedorn et al. (2016) finds large negative 
effects,1 while others find much smaller total effects (Boone et al. 2016; Chodorow-
Reich, Coglianese, and Karabarbounis 2019a). The papers differ along several 
dimensions—in particular, in the choice of identification strategy and how labor mar-
ket outcomes are measured. Hagedorn et al. (2016) use a boundary-based approach 
exploiting differences at state  boundaries separating different UI regimes.2 Boone et 
al. (2019) use a modified boundary design while Chodorow-Reich, Coglianese, and 
Karabarbounis (2019a) take advantage of differences in UI due to sampling error in 
the measures used to determine state UI benefit levels. The divergent results may stem 
from a number of issues including bias in the different estimation approaches—an 
issue being debated in the literature (Hall 2013; Hagedorn, Manovskii, and Mitman 
2016; Chodorow-Reich, Coglianese, and Karabarbounis 2019a).
We reexamine the state boundary-based evidence by documenting the 
 fundamental tradeoff between two sources of bias when using such approaches. 
Boundary-based approaches require that the areas being compared on either side 
of the border would experience similar labor market conditions in the absence 
of a difference in UI duration. Effectively, this requires similar industry struc-
ture, labor productivity, and agglomeration effects on either side of the border. 
In the current context, it also means that the economic shocks that triggered UI 
 extensions in one state must evolve over space in such a way that areas on either 
side of the  border are affected similarly. Border-based approaches also require 
that the effect of the policy is concentrated on one side of the border. If these two 
conditions hold, then  differences in outcomes at state boundaries can be attributed 
to the  longer UI available in one state and not the other. However, there may be a 
tension between the two conditions since the same factors that make one side of 
the border an appealing control group for the other—a degree of similarity and 
labor market  connectedness—may also make policy spillovers more likely.
Conceptually, the first requirement to compare very similar areas is more 
likely to hold when focused on a very narrow area around state borders separating 
 different UI regimes. Note, however, that the county-level labor market data avail-
able and used in prior work may not satisfy this requirement—counties at state 
borders may be too large to ensure that the measured outcomes would be on average 
the same across border counties without the policy. This could lead to a discontin-
uous jump in county-level aggregate outcomes at boundaries even when there are 
no differences for smaller areas closer to the border. Ideally, we would use data at 
a smaller level of aggregation to better approximate the thought experiment behind 
the identification approach. Lacking reliable sub-county-level data, we propose a 
1 The large results found by Hagedorn et al. (2016) have led to a great deal of academic and media attention. 
See Hall’s (2013) comment on an earlier version of Hagedorn et al. (2016) and coverage in the Wall Street Journal 
(Wall Street Journal 2013) and Washington Post (Plummer 2014).
2 Differences in policy environments at state boundaries have also been used in other literatures. For example, 
see Holmes (1998); and Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010a, 2016). 
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measurement-error-corrected Regression Discontinuity (RD) approach that can 
approximate the results from a hypothetical regression using more granular data by 
controlling for the moments of the within-county population distribution relative to 
the border.
Ignoring aggregation issues and comparing county-level outcomes at bound-
aries, we estimate large negative effects of the UI extensions on unemployment. 
These uncorrected estimates suggest that an extension of UI benefits to 99 weeks 
would raise unemployment from a baseline of 5  percent to 9.9  percent, closely 
matching the results from Hagedorn et al. (2016). However, correcting for the use 
of county-level  aggregates, we find much smaller effects. For example, controlling 
for a  linear  function of  distance to the border, we find that extending UI benefits to 
99 weeks would raise unemployment from a baseline of 5 to 5.5 percent. We also 
find  suggestive, but imprecise, evidence that wages and earnings did not change 
 discontinuously at state boundaries.
While focusing attention on smaller areas closer to the border helps match the 
experimental ideal of comparing similar areas facing different UI duration, that 
proximity may also increase the possibility that the policy affects outcomes on 
both sides of the border, violating the second requirement for identifying policy 
effects at boundaries. In a small area with a connected labor market, the effect 
of UI  extensions may spill over the border since workers and firms have easy 
access to potential employment matches in the other state. By analyzing patterns 
in  cross-border employment by individuals, we find new evidence that workers 
who live near the border respond to changes in benefits in the neighboring state 
by  shifting employment, not necessarily residence, from the low-benefit state to 
the high-benefit state. This response is strongest close to the border—within a few 
kilometers—and fades as you look farther from the border becoming negligible 
roughly 25 kilometers away.
Combining the two sets of results highlights the tension between the two 
sources of bias—while focusing on areas closer to state borders will likely reduce 
the upward endogeneity bias from the shocks that triggered UI extensions, it will 
 simultaneously increase the importance of the attenuation bias from the treat-
ment spillovers. As both of these effects go in the same direction—toward smaller 
point estimates when  considering areas closer to the border—it is impossible to 
 disentangle the two without imposing strong assumptions on how they differen-
tially evolve over space. Together this trade-off suggests that the boundary-based 
estimation strategies are  ill-suited for directly identifying the macro effects of UI 
extensions on  unemployment rates.
Despite casting doubt on the applicability of border-based identification 
approaches in this setting, the observed employment spillovers do have implica-
tions  for the macro response to UI extensions. In particular, the increase in the 
 proportion of workers employed on the high-benefit side of state borders is con-
sistent with a  relative increase in labor market tightness in the high-benefit state. 
Such an increase runs counter to the main mechanism for a large macro effect 
through reduced  vacancies in a standard search model (Pissarides 2000; Hagedorn 
et al. 2016). Instead, it is more consistent with models that predict an increase in 
 tightness in response to UI extensions, such as the job rationing model of Michaillat 
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(2012) or the model of Kekre (2016) emphasizing increased vacancies due to the 
aggregate demand channel. In either case, these models would predict a macro effect 
that is smaller than the micro effect (Landais, Michaillat, and Saez 2018b).
Finally, our measurement-error-corrected RD approach provides an alternative 
to other boundary-based approaches when using aggregate data. It is particularly 
useful in cases where the main threat to validity is contemporaneous factors driving 
policy adoption that are likely to evolve through space, rather than more systematic 
differences across regions.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section  I discusses the literature on UI ben-
efits, provides a background on the institutional details of UI extensions in the 
Great Recession, and discusses the implications for boundary-based approaches; 
Section II provides a brief description of the data sources; Section III presents the 
measurement-error-corrected RD approach and the results; Section  IV provides 
evidence of treatment spillovers at the border and discusses the implications for the 
macro effect of UI extensions; and Section V concludes.
I. Background and RD Motivation
In the absence of any extensions, UI benefits are typically available for a 
 maximum  of 26 weeks in most states.3 The Great Recession brought about 
a series  of  UI  benefit extensions that were in many ways unprecedented in the 
United  States.4 In particular, UI extensions were implemented through two 
separate  programs: Extended Benefits (EB) and Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation (EUC). Prior to the Great Recession, the EB program provided 
either 13 or 20  additional weeks and was voluntary for states with only partial 
funding from the federal  government. In 2009, the federal government provided full 
funding, which led many states to take up the EB program. The EUC  program was 
introduced in 2008 and provides 13 to 53 additional weeks of benefits. Altogether, 
the EB and EUC programs led to an extension of UI benefit duration from 26 to as 
many as 99 weeks. Importantly for the identification strategies discussed here, the 
realized  levels of EB and EUC benefits were determined by state-level labor market 
indicators passing prespecified trigger levels. This implies that the key endogeneity 
concern stems from the contemporaneous, transitory shocks that triggered a UI 
extension for a state at a particular point in time, rather than systematic social, eco-
nomic, or political factors. Importantly, such contemporaneous factors would not 
be captured by including fixed effects in a regression.
The potential negative effects of increased UI generosity through reduced 
search effort has been well established in the literature (see Mortensen 1977; 
Solon 1979; Moffitt 1985; Meyer 1990; Katz and Meyer 1990). Here we will 
focus on the directly related literature studying the total effect of EB and EUC 
3 Note that the following states have a standard duration different from 26 weeks: Massachusetts, 
Montana,  Arkansas,  Michigan, South Carolina, Missouri, Kansas, Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina 
(see http://www.cbpp.org/research/economy/policy-basics-how-many-weeks-of-unemployment-compensation-
are-available). 
4 The following discussion on the institutional details of UI extensions during the Great Recession follows 
closely from the more detailed description found in Rothstein (2011a). 
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extensions during the Great Recession. A key challenge in estimating the total 
effect is  accounting for the potential endogeneity of the UI extensions. Given that 
the UI extensions were triggered by negative economic shocks to each state, these 
extensions will be  correlated by construction with the adverse labor market effects 
of those same shocks. When comparing labor market outcomes across states with 
different UI regimes during the Great Recession, we risk attributing the deterio-
rated labor market conditions to UI differences, rather than the economic shocks 
that triggered them. The result will be an upward bias in the estimated magnitude 
of UI effects.
Hagedorn et al. (2016) address the endogeneity concern by adapting the 
Boundary Pair Fixed Effects (BPFE) approach used by Holmes (1998) and Dube, 
Lester, and Reich (2010a, 2016). The BPFE approach focuses on contiguous 
 counties at state  borders that, due to being in different states, are subject to dif-
ferent UI regimes. As  implemented, the BPFE approach tries to control for two 
types of confounding factors. First to control for contemporaneous shocks that 
may affect both counties in a pair at a given time—including those that triggered 
the UI  extensions— Hagedorn et al. (2016) regress the difference in labor market 
outcomes across  contiguous county pairs at state borders in a given quarter on 
the difference in UI benefit duration for each pair. Further differences between 
county pairs are then controlled for using the interactive effects framework from 
Bai (2009). See the joint online Appendix for a detailed discussion of the prior 
estimation strategy.
Identification is based on the assumption that unobserved factors driving labor 
market outcomes, including the economic shocks that triggered UI extensions, are 
on average the same within-county pairs. Conditional on these pair-level factors, 
the UI benefit effect is then identified off of differences in unemployment between 
states with different UI benefit durations. Intuitively, the BPFE approach attempts 
to approximate the experimental ideal of comparing outcomes for two areas that are 
identical in terms of the factors influencing labor market outcomes, but happen to 
operate under different UI regimes by chance. Using this approach, Hagedorn et al. 
(2016) find that the total effect of UI benefit duration is quite large. Their estimates 
suggest that permanently increasing benefits to 99 weeks would increase unem-
ployment from 5 to 10.5 percent, an effect that would account for all of the rise in 
unemployment during the Great Recession.5
The practical implementation of the BPFE approach using county-level 
 measures  of  outcomes rather than data from smaller areas raises concerns that 
the unobservable factors driving labor market outcomes may in fact differ across 
 border  pairs given the substantial heterogeneity in county size and economic 
makeup. For instance, if the population centers of the two counties in a pair are 
far from the border, then a comparison of county-level measures of labor  market 
5 In a replication study, Amaral and Ice (2014) rely on the same identification approach, but differ in the 
 sample used. Amaral and Ice (2014) exclude counties with unemployment rates above 10 percent and extend the 
sample to include years without large UI extensions. Doing so leads to smaller estimates, but they are still larger 
than comparable estimates in the literature. We focus on the original Hagedorn et al. (2016) results and sample since 
we prefer not to remove counties with high levels of unemployment and because our identification approach will be 
based only on periods with differences in UI benefits. 
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 outcomes may not reflect outcomes based on areas with similar fundamental 
 factors and responses to the shocks that triggered the UI extensions. In this sense, 
our  concern is that within-county differences may generate differences in the mea-
sured outcome across county pairs when no difference exists for smaller, more 
comparable, areas closer to the border.
Given this concern, we propose using an alternative identification strategy 
based on the same thought experiment. Specifically, we wish to use the UI  policy 
 discontinuity at state boundaries within a geographic RD framework to identify 
the jump in unemployment at state boundaries with different UI availability.6 
Rather than directly compare county pairs at a border, the RD approach controls 
for  distance to the border to compare the average difference in outcomes precisely 
at the border.
While switching to an RD setting allows us to use comparison groups close to 
the border, it does introduce other differences relative to the border-pair approach. 
The BPFE approach explicitly allows for different unobservables at different points 
along a border segment—i.e., different county pairs may have different fixed 
effects along the same state border reflecting different industries, agglomeration, 
or  transportation effects. It is important to note that an RD approach will implicitly 
account for these same factors. RD in this setting is based on the estimated jump at 
state boundaries in the conditional expectation of labor market outcomes—where 
the conditioning is on distance to the border. By averaging across areas at the same 
distance, it does not require that unobservables are evolving in the exact same way 
along the entire  border segment. Any factors that are particular to areas along the 
border segment that affect both sides—for instance factors captured by county-pair 
fixed effects— will contribute similarly to the conditional expectations on both sides 
of the border and will cancel out in the RD estimate.
To highlight the potential problem of using comparisons in county-level 
 measures  across borders without controlling for distance in an RD setting, 
Figure 1 plots the county-level log unemployment rate by the population-weighted 
mean distance to the border in kilometers for several sets of border counties where 
the marker size is proportional to county population. We weight by county  population 
and use the population weighted mean distance to match our main  analysis 
 discussed in Section IIIA. In each case, we plot the data for the low-benefit state 
to the left of zero and present the length of available UI in each state. The  average 
log  unemployment rate among border counties in each state is depicted by the gray 
dashed line. In each case, the difference in this average across borders is large and 
consistent with increased unemployment in the high UI state. However, fitting a 
 linear trend in  distance to the border weighting by county population— the  solid 
black line—on either side of the boundary leads to a much smaller gap in 
every case.
6 Lalive (2008) uses a geographic RD to study a substantial regional UI extension from 30 to 209 weeks for 
workers over the age of 50 in Austria in the early 1990s. He finds large labor supply responses for this age group. 
Our analysis is not only for a different setting—extensions in the United States for all age groups during the 
Great Recession—but it also differs in the focus on the total response through labor supply and demand. 
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Figure 1.  State Boundary RD Examples
Source: BLS LAUS, TIGER geographic shapefiles, EUC, and EB trigger reports
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The key point in Figure 1 is that the average difference across state  boundaries 
among border counties—reflecting a major source of the identifying variation used 
by the BPFE approach on county aggregates—can be quite large, but the labor 
 market conditions seem to converge near the border—reflecting the identifying 
 variation used by the measurement-error-corrected RD approach.
While Figure 1 pertains only to a few sets of border counties that were  chosen 
to illustrate the potential issues, it suggests that it may be important to test the 
 robustness of the large effect of UI benefits on unemployment using the alter-
native RD  identification approach. Importantly, our empirical analysis will not 
be based only on a handful of cases, but will pool together over 600 such epi-
sodes. By  pooling across so many separate RD designs, we avoid issues that 
would  surface when  relying on any one case, including small samples, over-fit-
ting or  under-fitting the  specification of the running variable, or idiosyncratic fac-
tors that happen to impact particular counties at particular points in time. Indeed, 
such factors would be expected to average out across the many cases consid-
ered. Online Appendix C provides evidence based on placebo tests supporting 
this possibility.
II. Data
In order to highlight the importance of our methodological approach, we match 
the data sources in prior work as closely as possible. We consider the period from 
2005 to the end of 2011. The data for the unemployment rate come from the Local 
Area Unemployment Statistics (LAUS) compiled by the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS). The LAUS provide estimates of county-by-month unemployment counts.7 
We aggregate these data to the quarterly level to match the prior work as well. When 
comparing to past work using quasi-differenced log unemployment, we use the 
monthly separation rate from the BLS’s Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey 
(JOLTS).
We also consider employment, earnings, and wage outcomes from the US 
Census’s Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI) and the BLS’s Quarterly Census 
of Employment and Wages (QCEW). For earnings, we use the average monthly 
earnings for all jobs in a county recorded at the beginning of the subsequent quarter. 
For wages, we use the average weekly wage from the QCEW.
We rely on two sources for the UI benefit duration variables. First, we use the 
data compiled by Rothstein (2011b) for the period 2005–2010, and we code the 
final year from the trigger reports for both the EUC and EB programs available 
online.8 Together this yields weekly data for each state on the number of weeks 
7 Note that the LAUS-based measures are derived, in part, by using state-level unemployment to help overcome 
sampling issues at such a low level of aggregation thereby introducing error in the measures, an issue discussed in 
Hall (2013) and Hagedorn et al. (2016). Once again, we choose to use the LAUS data to maintain comparability 
with past work. The placebo tests presented in online Appendix C provide evidence that using these measures does 
not generate an artificial jump in measured labor market conditions at boundaries. We use LAUS data from before 
the 2015 redesign to maintain comparability to past work (Boone et al. 2016). 
8 See http://ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/trigger/ and http://ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/euc_trigger/.
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of UI currently available. We again aggregate this data to the quarterly level, 
 weighting by the number of days a particular duration was in effect.
To implement our measurement-error-corrected RD estimation, we require data 
on the geographic population distributions within counties. We use  population 
counts by census block from the 2010 US Census found in the TIGER geographic 
shapefiles. The TIGER shapefiles provide precise location data for the census 
block borders allowing us to calculate the distance from the center of each census 
block to the state  boundary. The very small geographic scope of census blocks 
allows us to approximate a  continuous measure of distance to the border. Finally, 
we also use the  county-level 2010 US Census population counts as the weights for 
our weighted regressions.
III. Regression Discontinuity: Controlling for Endogeneity of UI Extensions
A key issue in the current setting is that measures of labor market outcomes 
are available (or reliable) only at an aggregate level, making direct implementa-
tion of the RD approach difficult. In order to highlight the implications of using 
aggregate measures and our methodological approach to dealing with these 
issues, we start with an ideal RD setting with hypothetical disaggregate data 
and show how it relates to the feasible estimation using aggregate data. Note 
that the BPFE approach effectively assumes any aggregation issues are simi-
lar in paired counties by removing only the unobservable factors common to 
both counties in the pair. By confronting the aggregation issues we are relaxing 
this restriction.
A. Measurement-Error-Corrected Geographic RD
To start, consider the basic RD setup in which we are interested in estimating the 
average treatment effect ( τ ) of a program or policy where treatment is determined 
by a continuous running variable crossing a particular cutoff. Denote the outcome 
of interest by  y , the running variable by  x and without loss of generality assume 
the cutoff occurs at  x = 0 . If the unobservable factors influencing the outcome 
evolve continuously at the cutoff then the average treatment effect at the boundary 
is  identified nonparametrically by comparing the conditional expectation of  y on 
either side of the cutoff:
(1)  τ =  lim 
h↓0 E[  y i |  x i = h] −  lim h↑0 E[  y i |  x i = h]. 
In our setting we would like to use distance to the state border separating 
UI regimes as the running variable in an RD setup to capture how the  unobservable 
 factors evolve on average as we approach the boundary. However, this is 
 complicated by the fact that the available data is aggregated at the county level. 
To help illustrate the problems posed by using aggregate measures, we begin by 
considering an ideal, but hypothetical, datasetting that would allow for straight-
forward estimation by RD.
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For simplicity, consider a single state boundary shared by two states in a single 
quarter. Denote our hypothetical, ideal sub-county-level observations by
  y i, c, s = ln ( u i, c, s ): log unemployment rate;
  x i, c, s : distance to the border;
 where
 i indexes subregions within a county at a
 given distance with population =  n i ;
 c indexes the county within the state;
 s = 0, 1 indexes the state with 0 the low-benefit state .
First, note that our hypothetical units of observation, denoted by  i , are geographic 
subregions within a county that are at a given distance to the border. Also note 
that we have observations on multiple counties within each state. Each of these 
 subregions has their own unemployment rate. If we had data on these subregions, we 
could estimate  E [ y | x, s] for each state separately and obtain the estimated Average 
Treatment Effect (ATE) at the boundary nonparametrically as the difference across 
the border in the mean log unemployment rate for economic subregions right at the 
boundary as in equation (1).
Measurement Error in the Running Variable.—We now consider what can be 
estimated when we move from our ideal RD set-up with county subregions to one 
using county-level data. The first issue that arises is that county-level aggregates 
allow for only one distance measure per county, so that the observed running vari-
able will take on one value for all subregions in a county. The resulting discrete 
measure of distance implies we must move from nonparametric to parametric RD 
estimation (Lee and Card 2008). For state  s , assume that among the set of border 
counties we can approximate the conditional expectation of  y by
(2)  E [ y | x, s] =  m s (x),
  where  m s (x) is a polynomial of order J .
For ease of exposition, let  J = 2 so that we can write our subregion-level regression 
equation for state  s as
(3)  y i, c, s =  b  0, s +  b  1, s  x  i, c, s +  b  2, s  x i, c, s 2 +  ε i, c, s .
The parametric ATE estimate with our hypothetical, disaggregated data will simply 
be  τ ˆ =  b ˆ 0, 1 −  b ˆ 0, 0 .
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One way to move from the subregion-level regression to one based on 
 county-level data is to use the fact that when data has a grouped structure, OLS 
on  the  individual data yields identical estimates to an appropriately weighted 
 regression on the group mean data. This leads to the following group-mean level 
regression estimated with weights proportional to the number of subgroups within 
a county:9
(4)  y –c, s =  b  0, s +  b  1, s  x –c, s +  b  2, s  _ xc, s 2 +  ν c, s .
Here,  y –c, s is the mean of  y i, c, s within a county and  
_
 xc, s r is effectively the  r th 
uncentered moment of the distance to the border over the population distribution 
for  each  county. Most importantly, these county-level distance moments do not 
need to come from the same dataset as the information on the outcomes of interest. 
Note that controlling for these moments differs from the common practice of using 
the distance from the geographic centroid of an area as the running variable (Lalive 
2008; Rathelot and Sillard 2008; Dell 2010; Dachis, Duranton, and Turner 2012; 
Chen et al. 2013; Falck, Gold, and Heblich 2014). This corresponds to a special 
case of the procedure in Bartalotti, Brummet, and Dieterle (2018), who show that 
using the moments will eliminate the asymptotic bias present when using the cen-
troid-based distance.
Aggregation-Induced Error in the Outcome Variable.—Given the nonlinearity 
in the log unemployment measure, we do not actually observe  y –c, s , the average 
log unemployment rate across the subregions in a county. Instead we observe  y c, s , 
the log unemployment rate for the county as a whole, where generally  y c, s ≠  y –c, s 
due to the nonlinearity in  y i, c, s . The fact that the two aggregate outcome measures 
differ is important because it could generate bias in our estimates by  introducing a 
wedge between what we can estimate with the available county-level data and what 
we would estimate with access to the ideal, but hypothetical, subregion-level data. 
Note that this is also a potential problem for the BPFE approach as it is directly 
linked to our motivating concern of within-county heterogeneity in  outcomes 
 relative to the border being linked to the shocks that triggered UI extensions.
We choose to cast this as a measurement error problem and write 
 y c, s =  y –c, s +  ϵ c, s , where  ϵ c, s is the measurement error from aggregating the 
 dependent variable. Plugging into equation (4), our estimating equation becomes
  y c, s −  ϵ c, s =  b  0, s +  b  1, s  x –c +  b  2, s  _ xc 2 +  ν c, s ,
(5)  y c, s =  b  0, s +  ϵ c, s +  b  1, s  x –c +  b  2, s  _ xc 2 +  ν c, s .
9 Note that how we define our subregions will determine the appropriate weights. Here, a reasonable choice 
would be to consider each subregion to have the same population,  n i =  n – ∀ i , so that the appropriate weights will 
be proportional to county-level population (more populous counties have more  n – sized regions). This corresponds to 
using sub-county areas with the same population as the relevant unit of observation in the hypothetical regression.
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Equation (5) is now based on county-level observations of variables we actually 
observe in the data. Our estimate of the intercept will identify:
  b ˆ 0, s =  b  0, s + E [ ϵ ̃c, s ] ,
where  ϵ ̃c, s is the residual from the linear projection of the measurement error 
on the  distance moments. Finally, this yields the following, potentially biased, 
 estimate of the treatment effect:
(6)  τ ˆ = τ + E [ ϵ ̃c, 1 ] − E [ ϵ ̃c, 0 ] .
Our ability to uncover the average treatment effect at the boundary depends on the 
difference in the average residual aggregation error across the border. More gener-
ally, it depends on whether the average aggregation error is systematically different 
for high- and low-benefit states.
In online Appendix A we show that the aggregation error for a county can be 
approximated by:
(7)  ε c ≈   σ U, c 
2 
 ____
2  Uc 2
−   σ L, c 
2 
 ____
2 
_
 Lc 2
,
where  σ U, c 2 and  σ L 2 are the variances of unemployed and labor force counts across 
the subregions within a county, and  
_
 Uc and  
_
 Lc are the mean unemployed and labor 
force counts for the subregions within a county. From equation (7), it is clear that 
the  measurement error is larger when there is more within-county variation in 
labor market outcomes across subregions and when this variation differs between 
 unemployment and labor force counts.
Using auxiliary data from a restricted-use version of the American Community 
Survey (ACS), we provide suggestive evidence in online Appendix A that 
this  approximation error is not systematically related to UI extensions. Across 
 specifications, the implied bias in our estimates varies from 0.0104 to 0.0833 
(in   absolute value), which is only 2 to 16 percent of the baseline estimates 
in Section  IIIB and suggests that this error is not a major source of bias in this 
 setting. Once again, this is important because it suggests that by controlling for the 
 distance moments we have some confidence that we are approximating the ideal, but 
 infeasible, RD in equation (3).
B. Main Specifications
Our application differs from the basic RD setup in that we have a sepa-
rate  geographic RD for each state boundary in each quarter when the two states 
have different UI benefits. We pool these separate RDs together, and include 
 boundary-by-quarter fixed effects in order to account for the mean differences 
across these separate RD designs. By pooling across many—over 600—separate 
cases, idiosyncratic factors particular to any given boundary at a point in time will 
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average out.10 We also estimate the effect of a continuous treatment variable, weeks 
of available UI, rather than a binary high versus low UI treatment as in Section IIIA. 
Moving from the binary treatment setting to estimating the effect of the duration of 
UI benefits in weeks simply requires rescaling the treatment effect by the difference 
in UI benefits across a border at a particular time.
In our baseline RD setup in equation (8) we do not control for distance to a 
border:
(8)  y c, s, g, t = π + γ  b s, g, t +  δ g, t +  ρ c, s, g, t ,
  where c indexes counties, s indexes states,
  g indexes state boundaries, and t indexes quarters;
   b s, g, t is the log benefit duration;
   δ g, t are boundary-by-quarter fixed effects .
In online Appendix B we discuss in detail how this approach relates to the BPFE 
 regressions. Intuitively, not controlling for distance in the RD is akin to not 
 allowing for within-county heterogeneity in the BPFE approach as both assume 
that the  county-level aggregate is an appropriate measure of the labor market 
 conditions at the border.
We then estimate regressions controlling for distance to the border using the 
 measurement error correction from Section IIIA:
(9)  y c, s, g, t = π + γ b s, g, t +  δ g, t 
 +  D g, t [(1 −  T s, g, t ) (  ∑ r =1
 R 0, g, t 
 θ g, t  0  _ xc r) + ( T s, g, t ) ( ∑ 
r =1
 R 1, g, t 
 θ g, t 1  _ xc r) ] +  u c, s, g, t ,
 where
  D g, t is a vector of indicators for each boundary-by-quarter;
  T s, g, t = 1 [ b s, g, t >  b −s, g, t ] are indicators for being on the 
 high-benefits side;
  _ xc r  is the r th uncentered moment of the distance to the 
 border distribution;
  R T, g, t is the order of the polynomial in distance for group T .
10 In online Appendix C, we provide placebo tests using data from boundaries in quarters where there was 
no difference in UI benefits to help illustrate this point. Across different ways of generating placebo treatment 
 variables, we find no evidence of a discontinuity at the border. 
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The expression in square brackets allows for different polynomial orders and for 
the effect of distance to differ across state-boundary-quarter groups. In practice, 
we consider separate linear functions in distance for each side of the border in each 
quarter. In other specifications, we allow for different polynomial orders for each 
side of the border in each quarter. We obtain  
_
 xc 
r from census block-level population 
counts from the 2010 US Census. We first calculate the distance from the center 
of that census block to the nearest state boundary.11 Note that for counties close 
to several state borders, not all census blocks in the county share the same nearest 
neighbor state. Fortunately, this affects less than 7 percent of census blocks within 
border counties. We therefore determine the modal nearest state boundary among 
the census blocks within each county and use the distance to that modal boundary 
for all census blocks in the county. Once we have the census block-level distances, 
we can easily calculate the necessary population-weighted uncentered distance 
moments. Note that census blocks are very small levels of aggregation, allowing us 
to approximate a continuous distance measure. For instance, the fifteen counties at 
the Texas-Louisiana border contain over 49,000 census blocks.
C. RD Results
Unemployment Rate.—Table 1 displays our main RD results for unemployment 
using the same set of border counties as was used in the previous  literature to 
 estimate the effects by BPFE. We present results weighting by county  population. 
Following Hagedorn et al. (2016), we also present calculations based on the esti-
mates for the implied  unemployment rate starting from a base rate of 5 percent 
under two  counterfactuals: one based on the average increase in benefits and one 
 assuming a change to the maximum benefit duration. We cluster standard errors at 
the  state-by-boundary level as this is the level at which treatment varies—account-
ing for both contemporaneous spatial correlation and serial correlation over time.
In column 1 of Table 1 we present RD results not controlling for distance. 
The implied unemployment rates from the policy counterfactuals—9.1   percent 
for change to the average benefit duration and 9.9 percent for a change to the 
 maximum   duration—are quite close to the corresponding BPFE estimates from 
Hagedorn et al. (2016) of 8.6 percent and 10.5 percent. Controlling for a linear func-
tion in  distance in  column 2 (captured here by including the population-weighted 
mean  distance from the border for a county) produces considerably smaller esti-
mates that are no longer statistically significant. The implied unemployment rate 
starting from a  baseline of 5 percent for the two policy counterfactuals drops to 5.5 
percent.
We also estimate the difference in labor market outcomes using  higher-order 
 polynomials in distance. Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), we use a 
 cross-validation procedure to choose the length of the polynomial, opting for 
the small  sample-corrected version of the Akaike Information Criteria (AICc). 
11 We use the nearstat package in Stata to calculate the distances (Jeanty 2010). We alter the ado file slightly to 
generate distances using Stata’s “double” precision storage type. Given the small size of census blocks, less  precise 
storage types lead to problematic rounding errors in identifying the center of a census block. 
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For each state-by-boundary-by-quarter we progressively add higher-order terms 
(quadratic, then cubic, and so on) until the AICc no longer suggests an improve-
ment in fit. Across all state-boundary-by-states-by-quarters, the largest polynomial 
 suggested by this procedure is a cubic. Allowing for different polynomials across 
quarters for the same state-by-boundary accounts for the possibility that different 
shocks will propagate through space in different ways. Using the AICc-selected 
polynomials, the magnitude of the estimate in column 3 falls slightly and now 
implies an unemployment rate of 5.2 percent for the two policy counterfactuals. 
Note that even with the AICc-chosen polynomial the estimates are still precise. The 
baseline estimate in column 1 is statistically different from that in column 3 with a 
p-value of 0.0134.
Employment, Earnings, and Wages.—We also use our measurement-error- 
corrected RD approach to estimate the change in the employment to population 
ratio,  earnings, and wages at state boundaries. Unfortunately, the estimates are 
not very precise, leading to large confidence intervals and suggesting  caution in 
 interpreting the results. The first row of Table 2 presents results for the employ-
ment to  population ratio. Not controlling for distance, we see a fairly large  negative 
 elasticity in response to extended benefits. Controlling for distance reduces 
the  estimate substantially, however, the new RD estimates are fairly imprecise. 
Table 2 displays results using log earnings from the QWI and the log of weekly 
wages from the QCEW as the outcome of interest. For both measures we  estimate 
Table 1—RD Estimates: log Unemployment
RD polynomial order
0 1 AICc
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Coefficient estimates
log unemployment rate 0.5100 0.0765 0.0333
(0.1003) (0.1574) (0.1685)
Panel B. Implied unemployment rate from base of 5 percent
Average benefits 9.0% 5.5% 5.2%
[7.0, 11.1] [3.5, 7.4] [3.2, 7.2]
Max benefits 9.9% 5.5% 5.2%
[7.3, 12.5] [3.3, 7.8] [2.9, 7.5]
Observations 8,435 8,435 8,435
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state-by-boundary level in parentheses. 
 Ninety-five   percent confidence intervals in square brackets. RD polynomial order 
 indicates either no control for distance (polynomial order 0), a linear distance control 
( polynomial order 1), or higher order polynomial in distance with the order chosen for each 
 state-boundary-by-quarter using a small sample corrected version of the Akaike Information 
Criteria (polynomial order AICc). The implied unemployment rates in panel B are calculated 
 following Hagedorn et al. (2016) as  exp (ln (0.05) +  γ ˆ(ln (b) − ln(26))) where the corfactual ben-
efit duration is either  b = 82.5  weeks (average benefits) or  b = 99  weeks (maximum benefits).
Sources: BLS LAUS, TIGER geographic shapefiles, EUC, and EB trigger reports.
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 negative  elasticities when not controlling for distance that become  positive, but 
very  imprecise when including a linear function in distance to the border. Finally, 
when allowing for a higher order polynomial, both estimates are smaller in mag-
nitude, but still imprecisely estimated. Despite the imprecision, the pattern of 
estimates is consistent with our motivating story of estimates using county-level 
measures being biased by the negative shocks triggering the UI extensions.
D. Comparison to Past Work
Taken at face value, the results above suggest much smaller effects of UI exten-
sions on unemployment during the Great Recession than found in Hagedorn et al. 
(2016). Nevertheless, these results differ from Hagedorn et al. (2016) in two import-
ant ways. The first difference is our choice of using a measurement-error-corrected 
RD instead of the BPFE approach. In addition, we use the log unemployment rate 
as our main outcome of interest whereas Hagedorn et al. (2016) develop and use the 
“quasi-differenced” log unemployment rate as an alternative measure of unemploy-
ment. Here we will check the sensitivity of our results to using the quasi-differenced 
unemployment measure and applying the BPFE methodology. See the joint online 
Appendix for a detailed replication of the original Hagedorn et al. (2016) results.
Hagedorn et al. (2016) note that regressing log unemployment on UI benefits may 
not ident ify the contemporaneous effect of UI benefits. Rather, such an approach 
will identify the combined effect of current benefits and expectations over future 
benefits — an effect that is difficult to interpret. Intuitively, today’s undifferenced 
Table 2—RD Estimates: Employment, Earnings, and Wages
RD polynomial order
0 1 AICc
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3)
log emp/pop: QWI −0.3047 0.0009 −0.0826
(0.1222) (0.3798) (0.3985)
Observations 8,379 8,379 8,379
log earnings: QWI −0.0291 0.1004 0.0030
(0.1153) (0.1515) (0.1648)
Observations 8,380 8,380 8,380
log weekly wages: QCEW −0.0567 0.1456 −0.0359
(0.1156) (0.1471) (0.1583)
Observations 8,444 8,444 8,444
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state-by-boundary level in parentheses. RD polynomial 
order indicates either no control for distance (polynomial order 0), a linear distance control 
(polynomial order 1), or higher order polynomial in distance with the order chosen for each 
 state-boundary-by-quarter using a small sample corrected version of the Akaike Information 
Criteria (polynomial order AICc).
Sources: QWI, QCEW, TIGER geographic shapefiles, EUC, and EB trigger reports.
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unemployment rate may reflect changes in vacancy creation decisions by firms due 
to expectations over future UI benefit duration. Since future benefits determine the 
reservation wage of workers and, in turn, expected future profits to the firm from a 
current job match, they directly affect the value of that filled job today. Hagedorn 
et al. (2016) show that under some assumptions the quasi-differencing will cancel 
out the portion due to future benefits leaving just the portion due to current benefit 
duration.
In Table 3, we present results using the quasi-differenced measure and the 
BPFE estimation approach, as well as applying our measurement-error-corrected 
RD approach using the quasi-differenced outcome measure. The BPFE results are 
estimated from the following equation after creating a county-pair level dataset from 
our baseline county-level panel:
(10)  Δ y p, t = αΔ b p, t +  ψ  p +  ϕ t +  v p, t ,
 where p indexes county pairs,
 t indexes quarters ,
Table 3—BPFE versus RD Estimates: Quasi-Differenced log Unemployment
RD polynomial order
BPFE 0 1 AICc
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Coefficient estimates
Coefficient 0.0604 0.0660 0.0238 −0.0107
(0.009) (0.0113) (0.0202) (0.0227)
Panel B. Implied unemployment rate from base of 5 percent
Actual duration and benefits 8.6% 9.0% 6.1% 4.5%
[7.2, 9.9] [7.2, 10.8] [4.0, 8.4] [2.7, 6.4]
Permanent and max benefits 10.5% 11.2% 6.7% 4.4%
[8.2, 12.7] [8.2, 14.3] [3.4, 9.9] [2.0, 6.8]
Observations 32,972 8,446 8,446 8,446
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the state-by-boundary level for RD and pair level for BPFE 
in  parentheses. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals in square brackets. BPFE  indicates 
boundary pair fixed effects  estimates. RD  polynomial Order indicates either no control for 
distance (polynomial order 0), a linear  distance  control ( polynomial order 1), or higher order 
polynomial in distance with the order chosen for each  state-boundary-by-quarter using a small 
sample corrected version of the Akaike Information Criteria (polynomial order AICc). The 
implied  unemployment rates in panel B are calculated following Hagedorn et al. (2016) as 
 exp (ln (0.05) +  γ ˆ  1 − ( β  (1 − d) τ  )  __________1 − β(1 − d ) (ln(b) − ln(26)) ) , where the corfactual benefit duration 
is either  b = 82.5 weeks (average benefits) or  b = 99 weeks (maximum benefits), the 
 counterfactual duration of the UI extension is either  τ = 16 quarters (average duration) 
or  τ = ∞ quarters ( permanent duration), the discount factor is  β = 0.99 , and the  separation 
rate is  d = 0.1 .
Sources: BLS LAUS, TIGER geographic shapefiles, EUC, and EB trigger reports.
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where  Δ y p, t is the difference between two border counties in a given quarter in 
the quasi-differenced log unemployment rate, and  Δ b p, t is the corresponding 
 difference in log unemployment benefit duration. The quasi-differencing is given 
by the following:
  y t = log ( u t ) − β (1 −  d  t )log ( u t+1 ),
  where
   u t  is the unemployment rate;
  β is the discount rate;
  d is the job separation rate .
The BPFE estimates in column 1 are quite close to the original Hagedorn et 
al. (2016)  estimate. Since the quasi-differenced measure takes account of expecta-
tions over future  benefits, we now need to account for both the size of the benefit 
extension and the duration for which the extension is in effect when calculating 
the counterfactual unemployment rates. The implied counterfactual unemployment 
rates in column 1 are very close to the BPFE estimates from Hagedorn et al. (2016) 
of 8.6 percent and 10.5 percent. Importantly, when we switch from the BPFE esti-
mation to the RD estimation not controlling for distance to the border in column 
2 we also find similar estimates. However, just as with our main specification, the 
estimates fall and become small and statistically insignificant when we add controls 
for distance in columns 2 and 3. This suggests that our divergent results are due to 
the choice of methods rather than our choice of dependent variable.
These patterns highlight the concerns with using county-level aggregates in 
this setting. Specifically, the fact that the estimates of large labor market effects 
 disappear once we control for distance to the border is consistent with the story that 
the negative shocks that triggered UI extensions disproportionately affect areas in 
the high-benefit states—even when considering only border counties.
IV. Policy Spillover Evidence
We now turn our attention to the second potential source of bias when using 
boundary-based identification approaches— across-border policy spillovers. In 
 particular, when people face low costs of working or searching in either state at a 
boundary, changes to UI benefits in one state may affect workers and firms in both 
states. This will bias the resulting estimates toward zero, and this bias is expected 
to be more important closer to the border where labor markets are more integrated. 
Given the importance of both the distance to the border and the  potential  problems 
from using highly aggregated data uncovered by our RD approach, we look for 
 evidence of policy spillovers close to state borders within small  geographic areas 
in border counties. Hagedorn et al. (2016) look for evidence of  across-border spill-
overs by  considering subsample sensitivity checks—focusing on counties within 
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30 miles of a border or only considering border pairs within the same Core Based 
Statistical  Area—and by looking for evidence of out-of-state search using the 
county-level ACS commuting data available for counties with population greater 
than 100,000. Across these sensitivity checks and additional analyses, Hagedorn et 
al. (2016) find no statistically significant differences from their main estimates or 
any evidence of changes in across border search.
We explore the possibility of workers in one state altering their job search 
patterns in response to UI benefits in neighboring states using data from the 
Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Origin-Destination 
Employment Statistics (LODES). The LODES provide annual counts of employed 
workers for pairs of census blocks with one census block indicating the location 
of residence and one indicating where they work. For our application, we use the 
count of all jobs presented in the JT00 LODES files. This very precise location 
information allows us to identify changes in the number of people working across 
the state border in response to differences in UI benefits.12
A. Event History Approach
To test the worker search response to UI differences across borders in a clean 
 manner, we consider an event history approach based on a subsample of state 
 boundaries. We first identify 57 of the 106 state boundaries where there is a 
 difference between the two states in UI benefit duration, such that one state is always 
the high-benefit state and one is always the low-benefit state—allowing the states 
to have the same benefit duration in some quarters.13 This sample selection  creates 
two clear “treatment” groups, avoiding difficulties in modeling the dynamic changes 
in job search and vacancy creation behavior as the relative generosity of benefits 
between the states changes over time. In particular, if UI benefit differences are 
most important when searching for a job or if search frictions result in the  measured 
 fraction working across the border to respond slowly, then we might suspect that 
current employment outcomes depend on past UI differences. In our restricted 
 sample, workers and firms have more time to respond to the UI differences and the 
responses in one period will not be offset by responses in other periods when the 
relative ranking of UI benefit duration at a boundary is switched. Importantly, this 
choice of sample includes a fairly representative group of boundaries, as shown in 
online Appendix Table E.1.
12 As a caveat, producing the LODES requires the Census Bureau to multiply impute data in the case of missing 
information and to protect confidentiality in small areas through use of noise infusion and synthetic data methods. 
See Graham, Kutzbach, and McKenzie (2014) for a discussion of the imputation process. Importantly, even before 
imputation, 97 percent of jobs are located with sub-county-level precision and 96 percent of worker residences have 
at least county-level precision. The imputation ensures, at least, census-tract-level precision for all residences. The 
method used for protecting workers’ residence is based on census-tract-level residence distributions for 90 percent 
of home-to-work flows, with only long-distance commutes based on more aggregate geography. For our purposes, 
this helps ensure that we have properly identified the state of employment and captured the distance to the border 
at a fairly small disaggregated level. 
13 Generally, not all states have data available in all years in the LODES; however, each state in this subsample 
is present in all years used. 
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Figure 2 depicts the mean UI differences over time for our high-benefit and 
 low-benefit states. Since the LODES employment data are based on records from 
the beginning of the second quarter in each year, we label the axis at April of each 
year. The vertical dashed lines mark the beginning of April 2008 and the beginning 
of April 2009. Note that prior to April 2008, there were no benefit differences for the 
previous four years in this subsample. However, between April 2008 and April 2009, 
we see a steady increase in average benefit differences that corresponds to the intro-
duction and subsequent expansion of the EUC program. By April 2009, we see an 
average difference between the high-benefit and low-benefit states of over 10 weeks. 
For the most part, this difference in mean benefit duration persists until April 2011.
We now consider how the fraction of individuals working across the border 
evolves over time for our high-benefit and low-benefit subsamples. We calculate 
the fraction of employed individuals who work in the neighboring state by home 
census block. Table 4 provides summary statistics for the fraction and number of 
workers employed across the border along with the total number employed for 
the high-benefit and low-benefit event history samples, focusing on census blocks 
within 5 kilometers of a state border in the final pre-policy period, 2008.
In panel A of Figure 3 we display trends in the average fraction working across 
the border by year for census blocks within 5 kilometers (km) of the state border in 
our two groups—similar results are found when using 1 km and 10 km bandwidths. 
We  normalize the fraction to be zero in 2008 for both groups to focus attention on 
the before and after comparison. Again, we mark the transition period between 
April 2008 and April 2009 with vertical dotted lines. We see a relatively flat profile 
for the  fraction working across the border before 2009 for both the high-benefit 
Figure 2. Mean Difference in Maximum UI Benefits over Time
Note: Average difference in available benefits for the subsample of states identified as 
always high-benefit and always low-benefit at a given boundary by week over our sam-
ple period allowing for weeks in which there is no difference.
Sources: EB and EUC trigger reports.
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and low-benefit states when there were no differences in UI benefits. However, by 
April of 2010, after over one year of sustained mean benefit differences, we see a 
decline in the proportion working across the border for those living in high-benefit 
states and an increase for those living in low-benefit states. This is consistent with 
 workers targeting their job search in high-benefit states in connected border area 
labor  markets. Given a base rate of 14.8 percent in the low-benefit states in 2008, 
the nearly 3 percentage point increase in the employed population working across 
the border is substantial.
In panel B of Figure 3, we show the difference between the two lines in panel A, 
yielding difference-in-differences estimates, along with 95 percent  confidence 
 intervals using standard errors clustered at the state-by-border level as in our 
main analysis. Note that these confidence intervals are likely to be conservative as 
they allow for arbitrary correlation between census blocks along the border both 
 contemporaneously and over time. For instance, we are allowing for correlation 
in the error term for a census block on the western edge of a state border in 2004 
with a census block on the eastern edge in 2011. While the 95 percent confidence 
 intervals overlap zero for both the 2010 and 2011 differences, the joint test of 
whether the difference between the high-benefit and low-benefit states was the 
same in 2010 and 2011 compared to 2008 is rejected with a p-value of 0.0408. As 
a point of comparison, the joint test for the two years prior—2005 and 2006—does 
not reject the null with a p-value of 0.7985. This suggests that census blocks within 
5  kilometers of state borders in the high-benefit and low-benefit states experienced 
 different trends in the  proportion working across the border once benefits differed 
between the two groups.
We also show the evolution of the number of workers employed across the 
 border in panels C and D and the total number employed in either state within the 
census block in panels E and F—reflecting the numerator and denominator of the 
proportion variable used in panels A and B. In terms of the level of across-border 
employment, we see a slight increase for the high-benefit states but a much larger 
increase for the low-benefit states. The difference-in-differences estimate suggests 
nearly one fewer worker working across the border for the high-benefit states. 
Given mean employment across the border of 2.45 workers for high-benefit states 
in 2008, this is a large response. However, the estimates in levels are less precise, 
likely due to increased residual variation in levels of across-border employment 
compared to the fraction. Finally we see that for both sets of states the total number 
Table 4—Summary Statistics: Event History Sample Census Blocks  
within 5 km in 2008
Low-benefit High-benefit
Mean SD Mean SD
Fraction working across border 0.15 0.24 0.20 0.26
Number working across border 2.45 8.30 3.62 11.29
Total employed 18.64 37.96 17.59 35.65
Observations 82,508 68,223
Source: LODES
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of residents per census block who were employed in either state was increasing 
after 2009, likely reflecting the economic recovery.
We next consider how this response to benefit changes varies at differ-
ent  distances to the border. Given the stark difference between 2007–2008 and 
 2010–2011 for the sample of census blocks within 5 kilometers shown in Figure 3, 
we  calculate the average proportion working across the border in 2010–2011 and 
 subtract the average from 2007–2008 for each census block in a border county. 
Figure 3. Across-Border Employment Over Time
Note: Average proportion working across the state border relative to 2008 for census blocks within 5 km of a state 
boundary for states identified as always high-benefit and always low-benefit at a given boundary over our sample 
period allowing for weeks in which there is no difference.
Sources: LODES and TIGER Geographic Shape Files.
−0.02
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Census blocks within 5 km
Census blocks within 5 km
Census blocks within 5 km
Census blocks within 5 km
Census blocks within 5 km Census blocks within 5 km
Panel A. Proportion working across the border: 
relative to 2008
−0.1
−0.05
0
0.05
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Panel B. Difference-in-difference: 
high-low relative to 2008
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Panel C. Number employed across border: 
relative to 2008
−3
−2
−1
0
1
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Panel D. Difference-in-difference: 
high-low relative to 2008
Panel F. Difference-in-difference: 
high-low relative to 2008
−1
0
1
2
3
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Panel E. Total number employed: 
relative to 2008
−5
0
5
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Low benefit states
High benefit states
Low benefit states
High benefit states
Low benefit states
High benefit states
Difference-in-difference
95% CI clustered at 
 state-by-border
Difference-in-difference
95% CI clustered at 
 state-by-border
Difference-in-difference
95% CI clustered at 
 state-by-border
Year Year
Year Year
Year Year
106 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: ECONOMIC POLICY MAY 2020
Figure 4  displays a nonparametric regression of this difference in the propor-
tion working  across the border on the distance to the border separately for the 
sample of low and  high-benefit states. Consistent with the previous results, we see 
an increase in the fraction working across the border from low-benefit states and 
a decrease for those in high-benefit states very close to state borders. Importantly, 
this difference falls as one moves farther from the border. For those in low-benefit 
states, the difference falls to near zero by around 25 kilometers from the border. 
For the high-benefit states, it approaches zero by 10 kilometers to the border, but 
shows some small variation up to 50 kilometers.
B. Implications for Boundary-based Identification Approaches
The pattern in Figure 4 is consistent with the spillover effects falling as one 
moves further away from the border. Of course, focusing on areas 30 or 40 kilome-
ters from the border may reduce concerns over the associated attenuation bias, but at 
the same time it will raise concerns over the endogeneity bias from the shocks that 
triggered UI extensions. This highlights the fundamental issue for boundary-based 
identification approaches, such as BPFE or geographic RD; these approaches trade 
off between two sources of bias and there is no clear or  straightforward way to 
distinguish between the two. Note that among the set of border counties used here, 
the population weighted mean distance to the border has an average of 23 kilome-
ters and a maximum of 261 kilometers, implying that the BPFE approach using 
 county-level aggregates will be affected by a mix of these two biases. The  geographic 
scope of the spillovers presented in Figure 4 is also consistent with the fact that 
Hagedorn et al. (2016) find no statistically significant differences when limiting 
Figure 4. Change in Proportion Working across the Border: 
Census Blocks 2010–2011 versus 2007–2008
Note: Local polynomial smoothing regression of the change in proportion working 
across the border by distance to the border.
Sources: LODES and TIGER geographic shape files.
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the sample to counties within 30 miles (approximately 48 km) since the spillovers 
appear to die out within this window around state borders.
C. Full Sample: Census Block Fixed Effects
Here, we expand our sample to include all state boundaries in order to check 
whether the previous results were driven by the choice of our clean event history 
sample. We use the full sample of census blocks by year that are within 5 km of 
the border and estimate the following:
(11)  f i, s, g, t = α + βΔ b –s, g, t +  δ i +  ϕ t +  ε i, s, g, t ,
  where i, s, g, t index census blocks, states, boundaries, and years;
  f is the fraction of workers employed in the neighboring state;
  Δ b –s, g, t =  b –s, g, t −  b –−s, g, t is the yearly average difference in 
  benefit weeks;
   δ i are census block fixed effects;
   ϕ t are year fixed effects .
Table 5 presents the estimates of equation (11) with standard errors clustered at the 
county level to allow for arbitrary spatial and serial correlation. Consistent with the 
story above, we estimate a negative relationship between the relative generosity of 
UI benefits in your home state and the fraction working in the other state. That is, as 
the UI benefits in your state of residence increase relative to those across the  border, 
workers are less likely to work in the neighboring state. Likewise, as the  benefits in 
their home state fall further behind those across the border,  workers are more likely 
to work in the neighboring state. To provide a sense of scale, the estimates suggest 
that having benefits 15 weeks longer in your state of residence, roughly the mean 
benefit difference in periods with a difference, would lower the fraction working 
across the border by 3.0 percentage points. This is 19 percent of the mean fraction 
working across the border for census blocks within 5 km.
While the census block fixed effects help control for time constant hetero geneity 
related to both the propensity for individuals to work in the neighboring state and 
the UI benefits differences, it does require a strict exogeneity assumption that 
 E  [ ε i, s, g, t | Δ b –s, g, 1 , …, Δ b –s, g, T ,  δ i ] = 0, t = 1, …, T . We might be concerned that 
the fraction working across the border in one year may be the result of job matches 
made in previous years when the relative generosity of UI benefits differed. One 
way to account for this potential feedback and violation of strict exogeneity is to 
directly control for lagged values of the UI benefit difference. In Table 5, we see 
that  controlling for the lagged benefit difference or up to three years of lagged 
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 differences has little effect on the estimated contemporaneous effect. In addition, 
the effects of previous benefit differences become smaller as we look at further and 
further lags.
D. Implications for Macro Effects of UI Extensions
The evidence above suggests that residents of one state may respond to UI 
benefit changes in the neighboring state. This analysis by itself cannot be used to 
directly evaluate the effect of UI extensions more generally. For instance, it tells us 
 nothing of the aggregate importance of shifting job creation or employment between 
areas  facing different UI regimes. However, the particular nature of the spillovers 
 presented here does provide insight into the equilibrium response to UI extensions. 
In particular, it is consistent with models that predict an increase in labor market 
tightness in response to UI extensions (Michaillat 2012, Kekre 2016). As an illustra-
tion, we consider the observed flows in light of the job rationing model of Michaillat 
(2012) to provide one possible explanation for why workers might shift their search 
to the high-benefit state following the extension of UI benefits.
To start, we consider the response to an increase in UI in the model, ignoring 
for the moment the workers who are not eligible for the extended benefits offered 
in the high-benefit state. Following the discussion in Landais, Michaillat, and Saez 
(2018b), consider the response in terms of employment and labor market  tightness 
( θ )—the ratio of vacancies to aggregate search effort (product of the  number of 
searchers and individual search effort). On the labor supply side, employment is 
increasing in tightness—as the number of vacancies goes up relative to  aggregate 
search effort, the probability of finding a match goes up resulting in higher 
 employment. In a  simplified version of the model, production is characterized by 
a concave  production function and wages are fixed (Landais, Michaillat, and Saez 
2018b). Labor demand is  therefore downward sloping in employment-tightness 
space reflecting the  diminishing marginal product of labor at a fixed wage. The 
Table 5—Effect of Relative UI Benefit Duration on the Fraction Working across 
the Border: Census Block Fixed Effects
(1) (2) (3)
Relative UI difference −0.0020 −0.0017 −0.0019
(0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Lagged UI difference −0.0008 −0.0007
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Second lag UI difference −0.0009
(0.0004)
Third lag difference 0.0003
(0.0010)
Observations 2,631,856 2,122,461 1,404,106
 R 2 0.0044 0.0063 0.0095
Note: Standard errors clustered at the county level reported in parentheses.
Sources: LODES and TIGER geographic shape files.
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equilibrium employment and market tightness before a change in UI is depicted in 
panel A of Figure 5 by the intersection of LS1 and LD1 at point A.
The increase in UI reduces search effort by unemployed workers, thereby 
 shifting  labor supply from LS1 to LS2 in the figure. Holding all else fixed, this 
results in a reduction in employment from point A to B. This reduction in 
 employment due  to reduced search effort is referred to as the microelasticity of 
employment to UI (Landais, Michaillat, and Saez 2018b). Since wages are fixed 
in this model, labor demand does not shift in response to increased UI benefits. 
In the figure, there is a movement along the new, upward sloping labor supply 
curve — increasing  tightness and employment— until it intersects the original labor 
demand curve. Here, the macro—or total—effect of the UI increase (from A to C) 
is smaller than the micro effect (from A to B). Importantly, this runs counter to the 
motivation for large macro effects of UI in Hagedorn et al. (2016).
The presence of out-of-state searchers complicates the model. First, we need 
to distinguish between unemployed searchers whose previous job was in the 
high-benefit state who are, therefore, eligible for the extended UI and those from 
the low-benefit state who are not eligible—regardless of their state of residence. 
Here we will consider out-of-state searchers to be those with access to the lower 
 benefits and consider how they affect the outcome in the high-benefit state. We 
must assume that firms in the high-benefit state are more affected by the change in 
UI  benefits so that the effects highlighted in Figure 5 are stronger in the high-ben-
efit state. For instance, if unemployed workers are more likely to search in their 
home state— or the state of their last job—then firms in the high-benefit state would 
be more likely to be matched with a high UI eligible worker. As simple evidence in 
support of there being some friction at state boundaries, even within one-tenth of a 
kilometer of state borders only 22.7 percent of workers are seen working across the 
Figure 5. Response to UI Increase in Job Rationing Model (Michaillat 2012)
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border in the LODES data in the period before any UI differences. Further, the fact 
that we observe any change in work locations in response to UI differences at state 
 boundaries suggests that the policy impacts the two sides differently.
Since out-of-state searchers are not eligible for the higher benefits, they will 
not reduce their search effort. However, the change in tightness that occurs in the 
high-benefit state may alter their choice of which state to search in. Given the 
fixed  wage,  the job rationing model would predict that the increase in tightness 
in the high-benefit state will make the high-benefit state more desirable since it 
would generate a wedge in the probability of making a match between the two 
states. Therefore, we would expect more people to search in the high-benefit state. 
In terms of the figure, labor supply in the high-benefit state would shift to LS3 in 
panel B, moving along the labor demand curve (from point C to D). Since these new 
searchers may be residents of either state—but happen to have previously worked in 
the low-benefit state—this would increase the proportion from the low-benefit state 
working across the border while reducing the proportion from the high-benefit state 
working in the low-benefit state. This is precisely what we found in Section IIIC and 
is an unambiguous implication of the job rationing model in this setting.
Note that the observed pattern of across border employment could also be 
 consistent with a more standard matching model with bargaining over wages 
as in Pissarides (2000). Unlike the job rationing model, the model predicts that 
 tightness would fall in response to an increase in UI and that the macro response to 
an increase in UI is larger than the micro response (Hagedorn et al. 2016; Landais, 
Michaillat, and Saez 2018b). However, such a model would require a  substantial 
increase in wages in response to the UI increase in the high-benefit state to  offset 
the fall in tightness in order to explain the observed change in across border 
employment (see online Appendix D). The fact that we find no strong evidence of 
an increase in  earnings in Section IIIC provides some suggestive evidence against 
such a response. Fully distinguishing between the two models is an important area 
of further research.
The observed flows of employment location from the low-benefit states to 
the  high-benefit states are also potentially consistent with an aggregate demand 
response to UI extensions. Kekre (2016) presents a model in which UI extensions 
can increase labor demand through an aggregate demand externality when the 
unemployed have a higher marginal propensity to consume than the employed. 
Such a response could lead to an increase in tightness in the high-benefit state if 
the increase in demand is concentrated on that side of the border. Since residents 
of the high-benefit state are more likely to be eligible for the higher benefits, then 
if consumers are more likely to make purchases in their state of residence we 
might expect the aggregate demand channel to show up more in the high-benefit 
state. Like the job rationing model, the aggregate demand story would suggest a 
smaller macro effect of UI extensions.
In addition to predicting a smaller macro response to extending UI, the increased 
tightness in response to the UI extensions found in the job rationing and aggregate 
demand models has implications for the optimal UI policy as outlined in Landais, 
Michaillat, and Saez (2018a, b). In particular, if tightness rises in response to 
more generous UI benefits, then Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2018b) provide an 
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 argument for the efficient UI policy to be countercyclical—namely that UI should be 
more generous when unemployment rises. Our spillover results provide some sug-
gestive support for the key mechanism underlying this optimal UI response, thereby 
complementing other recent work (Lalive, Landais, and Zweimüller 2015; Landais, 
Michaillat, and Saez 2018b).
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we reanalyze the boundary-based approach to identifying the 
effect of UI extensions on the labor market. We raise two main issues. The first is 
 partially a data issue—the available county-level labor market measures used may 
be  aggregated at too high level to ensure a clean quasi-experimental  comparison 
across border counties. The second is a conceptual issue—the same factors that 
make an area a good control group for a neighbor across the border may make 
it more likely that the policy effect spills over the border contaminating the 
 quasi-experimental control group.
To address the first issue, we develop an RD approach that accounts for this 
 aggregation measurement error by controlling for moments of the underlying 
 population distribution within counties. Using this measurement-error-corrected 
RD produces significantly smaller estimates than either the previously used 
 boundary approach or a comparable RD approach that relies on similar assump-
tions by  omitting controls for distance. These results help to reconcile prior work 
on the labor market effects of UI benefits, which has focused on two sources of 
 identifying  variation: differences in UI benefits at state boundaries and differences 
due to  sampling error in the real time unemployment measures used to trigger 
the UI  extensions. The two sets of papers find mixed results, with some of the 
 boundary-based results being large and negative, while the sampling-error-based 
approaches find smaller but imprecise effects. We show that when controlling 
for distance in an RD setup, our results from boundary-based methods are much 
more similar to those from  sampling-error approaches as well as those in Boone 
et al. (2016), who use a modified  boundary-based approach on a subset of  border 
counties. Our results also complement recent work by Chodorow-Reich and 
Karabarbounis (2016), suggesting that the effect of UI extensions may be muted 
due to the larger, offsetting cyclical changes in other components of the  opportunity 
cost of employment.
We also document treatment spillovers at state boundaries with workers close to 
state boundaries targeting their employment search in the high-benefit states. These 
findings are compatible with an increase in labor market tightness in high-benefit 
states associated with the extension of UI benefits. This also highlights our  concern 
with the policy’s effect showing up on both sides of the border, invalidating the 
 border-based approach in this setting. These spillover results complement other recent 
work on the effect of UI extensions on ineligible searchers (Crépon et al. 2013; Lalive, 
Landais, and Zweimüller 2015). On the whole, our results  provide  evidence against a 
large vacancy reduction effect of UI extensions and suggest  caution in using bound-
ary-based approaches to identify the causal effects of EB and EUC extensions.
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Our measurement-error-corrected RD also serves as an attractive alternative to 
the BPFE approach. It highlights the potential for bias from the more common 
 geographic RD approach of calculating distance to the border using geographic 
centroids,14 and is particularly useful in the case with the UI extensions during the 
Great Recession, when policy adoption is driven by contemporaneous factors rather 
than more systematic differences between the regions being studied.
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